Using a comprehensive dataset on issuances and holdings of contingent convertible debt instruments (CoCos) issued by European banks we investigate who invests in European CoCos. The results indicate that most European CoCos are not directly held by euro area investors. Foreign investors outside the euro area and investment funds located in Ireland and Luxembourg hold the large majority. Euro area banks, insurers and pension funds only have very limited direct exposures. Households in the euro area hold almost no direct positions in European CoCos, although there could be indirect holdings through non-euro area entities and euro area investment funds. Concerns for contagion through cross-holdings of CoCos by banks seem to be unwarranted.
Introduction
After the global financial crisis of [2008] [2009] , European banks have been increasingly relying on a new type of debt instrument: contingent convertible debt instruments or CoCos. These instruments enable banks to raise buffer capital at lower costs compared to equity issuances.
CoCos are subordinated fixed-income bonds that regularly pay relatively high coupons until a built-in trigger event occurs. This contractual trigger clause is typically activated by a breach in capital requirements, but could also be activated at regulatory discretion when banks get into trouble. When this happens, CoCos either automatically convert to equity or are written down. In this way, CoCos increase banks' loss-absorption capacity. However, depending on the terms of conversion, a trigger event may mean that CoCos holders bear losses before equity is wiped out. CoCos may thus prevent bank failures if the trigger event occurs at a bank that remains a going concern and the bank is automatically recapitalized in times of distress. In theory, CoCos make it more likely that taxpayers will be insulated from losses associated with bailing out banks. (Flannery, 2014; Koziol and Lawrenz, 2012) On the supply side, the CoCo market in Europe has expanded very rapidly in recent years. Banks' appetite to issue CoCos was particularly strong in Europe as new rules and regulations were being shaped in response to the financial crisis. To fulfil regulatory requirements, European institutional frameworks incorporated the use of CoCos, for example in the European implementation of the Basel III Accord, European Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR), the European Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and the European Banking Authority (EBA) requirements on bank's liquidity coverage ratio (LCR).
These regulatory developments also affected important design features of European CoCos, such as trigger level and maturity period (Boermans et al., 2014; Avdjiev et al., 2015) .
A burgeoning theoretical literature studies the different CoCo characteristics.
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However, empirical work on CoCos is still very limited and mostly focuses on bond yields (Hesse, 2016; Vallee, 2015; Avdjiev et al., 2015; Bethke, 2014; Avdjiev et al., 2013) .
This study contributes to the empirical literature on the CoCo market. One major gap in the literature is that very little is known about the holders of CoCos. Evidently, European banks are only able to sell CoCos if there are investors willing to buy these securities. The rapid growth of the market thus also implies strong demand for CoCos. However, as noted by Avdjiev et al. (2015) : "information on the evolution of CoCo investor base is not systematically collected by supervisors and is rather scarce." In their work they use data from Dealogic from 17 individual bonds with only a total amount outstanding of EUR 13 billion to obtain highly preliminary data from primary market holders of these CoCos to provide details on which investors bought CoCos at the moment of issuance (between April 2013 and March 2014). These initial placement data suggest that private banks and retail investors bought over half of the CoCos, while asset management companies purchased another 27%, and the rest was acquired by hedge funds (9%), banks (3%) and insurers (3%). In terms of geographic allocations the primary market data of Avdjiev et al. (2015) suggest that the main "investors" come from the UK, euro area and the US.
The main contribution of this paper is that we use comprehensive data on both CoCo issuances and holdings to provide insights on who invests in European CoCos. We benefit from a broad data collection of security-by-security holdings from euro area investors to determine who holds European CoCos. In contrast to Avdjiev et al. (2015) , we find that most CoCos On the holdings side we use a confidential dataset from the ESCB that contains information on bond holdings of euro area investors (ECB, 2015; Boermans and Vermeulen, 2016) . This data was compiled by euro area national central banks under a harmonized, mandatory reporting scheme to ensure high data quality and coverage. The holdings are collected at the individual security level and are made available at the country-sector holder level. We distinguish between the following euro area investor sectors: banks, insurers, pension funds, other financial intermediaries, mutual funds, non-financial corporations and households. Data on individual issuances are matched with holdings data using the ISIN code of individual CoCos.
A major benefit of our holdings data over primary market data is that it covers the 2015 year-end positions of different investor sectors from the euro area. A limitation is that some investors may use investment vehicles like mutual funds to hold indirect positions in CoCos.
These holdings would show up as mutual fund holdings. We cannot identify end-investors of these funds because the dataset does not inform us which individual mutual funds hold the CoCos. This is especially relevant for households which often use mutual funds for investments, thus creating a possible downward bias in our estimate of households' total (direct and indirect)
exposures. In addition, we do not have information on the holdings of non-euro area investors.
Hence, we apply a residual approach to calculate the non-euro area holdings, which we classify as foreign holder sector. (Avdjiev et al., 2015) is most likely due to the fact that they report primary buyers only; the banks holding CoCos in their data are probably primary dealer banks with temporary holdings of CoCos on their balance sheet only.
Results
[Insert Table 1 about here.]
Insurers' and pension funds' total direct exposures to European CoCos are EUR 3.5 billion.
This shows that these long-term investors have little interest in bearing the risks of contingent capital. Households in the euro area invest EUR 1.7 billion in CoCos directly. Although nonnegligible, households face significant hurdles when investing in these bonds due to the high minimum amounts to be invested. In addition, investments by retail investors have generally been strongly discouraged by regulators. However, we do not know whether households have indirect exposures to CoCos via euro area mutual funds or non-euro area entities. Household investing in bond markets tend to use mutual funds for investments. Table 1 shows that non-euro area investors hold EUR 116 billion or, using a residual approach, nearly 75 percent of the total amount outstanding of European CoCos. These foreign investors are the dominant holders. As can be seen in Figure 1 , however, about half of the issuances stem from banks in the United Kingdom and Switzerland. One may therefore expect an important share of the non-euro area investors to come from these regions, in line with the widely documented home bias in investment portfolios (Boermans and Vermeulen, 2016) . On the other hand, only 11 percent is denominated in GBP and only 5 percent in CHF, against for example 40 percent in USD. Taken together, this suggests that a large part of the European CoCo holders may be non-European investors after all. Table 2 gives a further breakdown of the CoCo holdings by euro area investment funds.
The analysis indicates that it is mainly funds from Luxembourg and Ireland that are holding
CoCos. This may be due to the relatively large size of these sectors in those countries and presumably to the tax advantages associated with basing investment funds in those locations.
It is also possible that foreign investors (i.e. not from Luxembourg or Ireland) use these funds to channel their capital to CoCos: both countries have large capital inflows from both euro area and non-euro area investors, thus making it difficult to identify the locations of the funds' end-investors (Zucman, 2013) .
[Insert Table 2 
